



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines


Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.


About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>





600026807T



0

171

OUR

NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

FOR

THE OPIUM TRADE.

*A SKETCH PREPARED FOR THE USE OF MEMBERS OF,
AND CANDIDATES FOR, PARLIAMENT.*

PUBLISHED BY

THE ANGLO-ORIENTAL SOCIETY FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE OPIUM TRADE,
8, BUCKINGHAM STREET, STRAND, LONDON, W.C.

1880.

16887. d. 1.

Donat. Proj. Bryce 1883

CONTENTS.

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| Introduction | 3 |
| Dictum of the <i>Times</i> | 3 |
| Description of the Opium Monopoly | 4 |
| Malwa Opium | 5 |
| A distinction pointed out by Sir George Campbell | 5 |
| The Monopoly not equivalent to Taxation | 6 |
| The responsibility of the Indian Government for the consumption of the drug | 8 |
| The Indian Government itself condemns the use of Opium | 9 |
| British Burma | 10 |
| Opium declared poison by Act of Parliament | 11 |
| Use of Opium universally condemned | 11 |
| Importation into Japan prohibited | 11 |
| Opium smoking condemned by the Chinese | 12 |
| Chinese opposition to the trade | 12 |
| The "legalization" of the trade was forced upon China | 13 |
| The last Chinese Protest against Opium | 14 |
| Evidence of Sir R. Alcock | 15 |
| The Chefoo Convention | 16 |
| Opium grown in China | 17 |
| Opium compared with alcohol | 18 |
| Summing up of the argument | 20 |
| Review of the apologies for the trade | 20 |
| Fallacious arguments | 21 |
| Mr. Gladstone's defence of the trade | 22 |
| The loss to the Indian Revenue | 25 |
| The demand for a substitute for the Opium Revenue | 26 |
| The Opium trade injurious to British Commerce | 27 |
| Drawbacks to the gain of the Indian Government | 27 |
| Conclusion | 28 |

APPENDIX.

| | |
|---|----|
| I. Net Opium Revenue, 1792—1834 | 30 |
| II. Net Opium Revenue, 1834—1878 | 31 |
| III. Government Opium Sales, 1802—1834 | 32 |
| IV. Export of Opium to China, &c. 1830—1878 | 33 |
| V. Extent of Cultivation, &c., 1848—1877 | 34 |
| VI. Opium imported into China | 35 |
| VII. General view of the Trade | 36 |
| VIII. The Prospects of Indian Finance | 37 |

OUR NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

FOR

THE OPIUM TRADE.

"I KNOW nothing at all about the question," said a member of Parliament to the writer, who had requested his help at a meeting called to consider the opium trade. He was a member of Parliament, and to Parliament every year the finances of India are presented for consideration, in which opium, after the land, figures as the largest item of receipt. The opium trade in British India is a Government monopoly, subsisting only by virtue of authority derived from Parliament. Opium is at the bottom of our miserable quarrels with China; and even now negotiations are going on, as they have been for three weary years, with the Government of that country in respect to the trade, which negotiations have been the subject of repeated inquiry in Parliament. All things considered, it does seem a little strange that an able and energetic M.P. should not be ashamed to acknowledge total ignorance of the subject. Only the despatch of armaments to the far East and the distant echo of battles and bombardments have availed to compel the attention of the general public for a passing moment to so remote a subject. But one might have hoped that a conscientious member of Parliament would not wait for news of the triumphant British forces, with their arms of precision, slaughtering thousands of undisciplined Chinese, to lead him to take some slight pains to understand this "root of bitterness" in our relations with that country. To make the task as easy as possible for any one willing to undertake it, the following brief sketch of the Opium Question is prepared.

Dictum of the
"Times."

"The Indian Government is the greatest manufacturer in the world, and last year it derived over nine millions sterling from the sale of its opium." So said the *Times* last December in a leading article. As regards the fact this

statement is literally correct, though there is a monstrous error in the figure. The sum derived by the Indian Government from the sale of its opium in 1877-78 was £3,773,960. In one line the *Times* has fallen into two errors: first, it forgot that a large part, about two-fifths of the Indian opium revenue, is not derived from "the sale of its opium," but from a tax on opium grown in the native States; and, secondly, it mistook gross receipts for net revenue. The *net* opium revenue has never yet reached eight millions, and the average of the last ten years is under six and a half millions. But setting aside the error in the amount, the *Times* statement is quite correct. The Indian Government is the greatest manufacturer in the world; and the *Times* might with perfect truth have added, the article manufactured is a poison.

**Description of the
Opium Monopoly.**

The system under which the Indian Government conducts its trade has been faithfully described by Sir Cecil Beadon, who was formerly Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and who was selected to give evidence on the subject before a Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1871. He told the Committee:—

The Government have established two agencies, one at Patna and the other at Ghazeeepore, which are usually called the Behar agency and the Benares agency. Each agency is divided into sub-agencies, which may be either coterminous with the ordinary administrative districts, or sometimes there are two, three, or four sub-agencies in one district. Under the sub-agents are native establishments, whose business it is to look after the cultivation. When any ryot wishes to cultivate opium, he goes to the sub-agent, and asks to have his name registered, his land measured, and to get a cultivation licence, and the usual advance. The sub-agent makes inquiries, has the land measured, and then makes the advance, upon the security of the person himself to whom the advance is made, and his fellow-villagers. The advance is made shortly before the sowing season. The ryot then sows his land, and when the plant is above ground, the land is then measured by one of the native establishments, and if the ryot has sown all that he engaged to sow, he gets a second advance; if he has not sown so much, he gets something less in proportion; or if more, he gets a little more. There is a sort of rough settlement at the second advance. Nothing further takes place till the crop is ripe for gathering, and when the ryot has gathered the crop he collects it in vessels, and takes it to the sub-agent's office; there he delivers it to the sub-agent, as the agent of the Government, and receives the full price for it, subject to further adjustment when the opium has been weighed and tested and examined at the agent's factory. The opium is then collected at the sub-agency and forwarded to the factory; there it is exposed for a

considerable time in large masonry tanks; it is reduced to a uniform consistency, and made fit for market, some for home consumption, and some for sale in Calcutta for exportation—the greater quantity for exportation. It is then packed in cases and sent to Calcutta, and in Calcutta it is sold by auction at periodical sales, and exported by merchants for consumption abroad. The extent of cultivation is limited according to the financial needs of the Government, entirely upon Imperial considerations. The Government of India, theoretically at least, if not practically, decide how much opium they will bring to market; and of course, upon that depends the quantity of land that they will put under cultivation and make advances for.”

Report, East India Finance, 1871, p. 154.

Malwa Opium. In those native States of India which still enjoy independence, or partial independence, the East India Company formerly acquired, under treaties extorted from the native princes, a monopoly of the opium trade within their borders, which lasted from 1818 to 1831. On account of the great discontent which these monopolies caused, and the difficulty of preventing smuggling, the treaty rights were surrendered, and ever since the production in the native States has been uncontrolled by the Indian Government, which, however, has indemnified itself and protected its own manufacture by laying a high duty on the Malwa opium, as it is called, as it crosses British territory on its way to the coast. For this portion of the opium trade then the Indian Government may plead that it is not responsible. It must, however, be remembered that the Mahratta and Rajpoot princes of India have no power on the China coast. *They* could not coerce the Chinese to admit Malwa opium into their land, and we have no right to impute to them the wish to do so. The Indian Government has, through its enormous tax, six or seven times greater pecuniary interest in the trade than they have. Moreover, it is the British power which forces open the door for the admission of the drug into China, and which keeps it open. Therefore, though we may partially free ourselves from the responsibility for the production of this Malwa opium, for its export we are responsible as directly as for the thousands of tons produced in our own manufactories.

A distinction
pointed out by Sir
George Campbell.

Sir George Campbell, M.P., who was formerly Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and in that capacity closely connected with opium, has frankly and sadly admitted, in his place in the House and elsewhere, that “in dealing with China and the Chinese, English diplomatists had not acted in a spirit of fairness and justice;”¹ but, in defence of the *Indian* Government, he con-

¹ Debate on Mr. Henry Richard's Motion, June 27, 1876.

tends that its responsibility ceases at the port of export, and that its monopoly is equivalent in effect to a heavy restrictive tax. Members of Parliament who discuss this matter with eminent Indian officials must be on their guard as to this distinction between the Indian and the Supreme Government. Men of high character in the Indian Civil Service have apologized for the opium trade, *so far as India and the Indian Government are concerned*, and their justification has been unwarily taken as covering the whole ground, although the plea was not meant to go beyond the limit which Sir George Campbell assigned to it. Her Majesty's Government and the Houses of Parliament are responsible both for what happens in India and for the diplomatic and military action in China. The Indian Government is but a subordinate department, and if it could completely vindicate its departmental action, this would not go far to settle the Opium Question. But we cannot accept the vindication offered. It assumes that India is in no sense accountable for the results of the opium trade after the drug is shipped in Bombay and Calcutta, and it would have us believe that the monopoly system is equivalent to taxation. Taxation restricts production, and the claim is that the monopoly, operating like taxation, is not objectionable, but rather praiseworthy. Let us examine this latter apology first.

The Monopoly not
equivalent to tax-
ation.

Sir George Campbell, in the debate in the House in
1875, contended that—

“Opium was one of those things upon which the imposition of a heavy duty enabled us to serve God and mammon at the same time—doing good to our neighbour by checking its consumption, and raising a large revenue for ourselves. . . . The Gothenburg system, under which the public authorities regulated the liquor traffic, so that as little harm as possible should be done to the community, was precisely analogous to the system followed in Bengal with regard to the opium traffic.”

To this Sir Edward Fry, one of Her Majesty's judges, has given a crushing reply in the *Contemporary Review* (June, 1877). Sir E. Fry proves that instead of the monopoly having been worked “for the sake of reducing the evil to a minimum”—as the *Spectator*, following Sir G. Campbell, asserted—“it has been worked from year to year for the sake of increasing the revenue to a maximum.” Up to 1823 the number of chests of opium sold by the Indian Government in Calcutta never amounted in one year to 5000 chests; this number increased gradually, until, in 1853, the provision for export exceeded 50,000 chests. But, as production increased, price went down, from £190 a chest in 1823 to £73 in 1853. Sir Cecil Beadon told the Select Committee:—

"It was thought in those days, that the more opium you made the more revenue you would get, but the result of the year 1853 showed the Government that there was a point beyond which it was not profitable to go, and that if you exceeded a certain quantity of opium, the price in China would fall so low that it would affect your net revenue."

In 1853-54 from the unprecedented number of 53,321 chests of opium, the Government realized a profit of only £46 per chest, or a total of £2,450,000. Only four years previously, from a production of 33,563 chests, they had realized a profit of £83 per chest, or a total of £2,780,000.² *Thus an increase of production to the extent of 20,000 chests entailed a loss of revenue exceeding a quarter of a million.* Thereupon the Government closed some of their agencies, and lowered the price paid to the ryots for the poppy-juice. The result was a fall in the produce in five years to below 22,000 chests. True the profit per chest in 1859-60 was £155 on 21,427 chests, or a total of £3,320,000; but this did not satisfy the Government. In Sir C. Beadon's words,—

"When the Government discovered that in 1858 the production had gone down to 21,000 chests, and threatened to go still farther, it became alarmed, and saw the necessity of doing something. It then saw that although the price in 1859-60 increased to 2000 rupees a chest, still the larger amount of profit got upon the smaller number of chests was not sufficient to compensate them for the more moderate profit which they lost upon the larger number of chests; *they therefore resolved to push the cultivation by every possible means, and to restore it to what it was before the fall took place; accordingly in 1860-61 the price (paid to the ryots) was raised to four rupees a seer, a seer being two pounds, that is 4s. a pound; and in the following year it was raised to 5s. a pound.*"

The argument that the opium monopoly is nothing more than a form of taxation vanishes before these statements. After the rise in the price paid to the cultivator, the production increased rapidly year after year, and the price fell, until in 1863-4 we find the production was 64,269 chests, which were disposed of at a gain of only £56 each; that is, the Government *trebled the production to realize upon each chest about one-third of the former profit.* This enormous mass of poison was wantonly thrown on the Chinese market, without even the miserable apology that the sale benefited India. Increase of production proving again a losing business, Sir Cecil Beadon, who was at that time in Bengal, induced the Government to resolve upon a steady annual production of 48,000 chests. He tells us—

"That, after inquiry, was considered to be about the quantity which the

² See Appendix, Table V.

China market would take off, without on the one hand reducing the price so far as to affect the revenue derived by the Government upon the export duty upon the Bombay opium; and on the other hand, it was considered that the price would not be so high as to encourage the importation into China of opium from other countries, or the manufacture of home-grown opium in China itself. And it was also pretty clearly shown that, according to the data then existing, 1200 rupees a chest in Calcutta, which was about the price that might be expected on a provision of 48,000 chests, was really that point at which the net revenue would stand the highest."

This arrangement did not last long. After the visit of Sir Rutherford Alcock to Calcutta, in 1870, when he laid before the Viceroy convincing proofs of the hostility of the Chinese Government to the opium trade (which will be referred to in a subsequent page), the Indian Government resolved to increase their annual production to 60,000 chests. This resolution has been carried into effect, and even exceeded. The latest figures are :—

| Year ending 1st March. | Sold by Auction for Export. | Produce of Season for Export. | Balance in Store for Export. |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | Chests. | Chests. | Chests. |
| 1874 | 42,750 | 54,716 | 34,544 |
| 1875 | 45,000 | 51,754 | 44,260 |
| 1876 | 45,510 | 68,051 | 50,504 |
| 1877 | 47,240 | 67,167 | 71,315 |
| 1878 | 49,500 | — | 88,982 |

And the latest news from India is, that the Government is still making efforts to increase the area under the poppy. This exhibition of a great Christian Government wildly experimenting to discover the exact out-turn which would yield the greatest net profit, oblivious of the fact that every chest they exported conveyed death and misery and degradation to the infatuated Chinese, is painful in the extreme, and dispels for ever the hollow pretext that the monopoly is anything better than the most cold-blooded, cynical pandering to vice.

The responsibility
of the Indian Go-
vernment for the
consumption of
the drug.

We now return to inquire, can the Indian Government rightfully plead irresponsibility for the opium after it is once fairly afloat? Is the distiller, then, absolutely free from all moral responsibility for the drink-traffic? and does that responsibility rest entirely upon the retailer? Surely, if opium is known to be a dangerous article liable to be abused, those who directly produce, and pour out on the

markets of the world thousands of tons of the drug every year, cannot so easily wash their hands when they have parted with the poison and counted out the gold. If it appears after a cool examination of the evidence reasonably certain that a great preponderance of evil results from the consumption of the drug, that it would be an immense gain to humanity if that vast mass of opium, instead of reaching any market, were to be burnt to ashes or sunk in the sea, then it is vain for the producers of the pernicious merchandise to expect absolution at the bar of God or man, on the empty excuse that they only engaged in the wholesale trade, leaving the retail to others. Before absolving the Indian Government, we must consider what is known as to the effects of opium.

The Indian Government itself condemns the use of opium.

The opium trade works its greatest mischief in China, but a quantity, considerable in itself though only a small fraction of the whole, is consumed in Indian territory. It is therefore important to notice the attitude taken up by the Indian Government towards opium consumption by its own subjects. The celebrated instructions of the Court of Directors to Lord Cornwallis, in 1817, are as explicit as could be desired :—

“The sentiment expressed in our despatch of 18th September, 1816, will have prepared you to expect our approbation of the measures adopted by you for the purpose of supplying from the Government stores a quantity of opium for the internal consumption of the country. We wish it at the same time to be clearly understood that our sanction is given to these measures, *not with a view to the revenue which they may yield, but in the hope that they will tend to restrain the use of this pernicious drug*, and that the regulations for the internal sale of it will be so framed as to *prevent its introduction into districts where it is not used*, and to limit its consumption in other places as nearly as possible to what may be absolutely necessary. WERE IT POSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE USE OF THE DRUG ALTOGETHER, EXCEPT FOR THE PURPOSES OF MEDICINE, WE WOULD GLADLY DO IT IN COMPASSION TO MANKIND.”

Appendix to Report on the Affairs of the East India Company, 1831, p. 11.

The two characters of opium-producers for China and guardians of Indian morals do not harmonize, and there is reason to fear that our Indian fellow-subjects suffer when the opposing motives clash. In his first Bengal Administration Report, Sir Richard Temple, in defending the monopoly, was obliged to admit :—

“The only drawback is the prevalence of smuggling in the districts where the poppy is grown. There is no doubt that the inhabitants in that quarter obtain much untaxed opium.”

But, in reply to a memorial from Europeans and natives deploring the increased consumption of spirits and drugs, Sir Richard unflinchingly asserted :—

“The Government already does, and will willingly do, everything in its power to impose a check, or to exercise repression, upon any excess.”

There is, therefore, no uncertainty about the principles of the Indian Government, whatever be the inconsistency of its practice. With one hand it holds back its own subjects from opium; with the other it pours into China the extreme paying quantity. Yet India does not escape scatheless. In India, generally, the opium vice is not
British Burma. extensively prevalent, but in certain regions, notoriously in British Burma, the inhabitants are demoralized by the drug. Commissioners, and Deputy-Commissioners, and Magistrates have acknowledged and deplored the evil³; the natives have petitioned for the closing of the opium dens; yet, whereas formerly, under the Burman sovereignty, the trade was prohibited under death penalty, now the British officials in Burma write for, and the Government of Bengal supplies, the drug, which is retailed in shops licensed by the Government! The existence of this demoralizing traffic under Government licence, is defended by the plea that it would be impossible to prevent opium being smuggled into the country were there no Government supply. That the officials are beginning to doubt the soundness of this defence, is apparent from the following extract from the last Administration Report of the Province :—

“Change in the National Character of the Burmese under British Rule.

“44 Remark has already been made under the head of police on the subject of magistrates’ preventive jurisdiction. As connected with this and the increase of crime and criminals, an allusion made in the Report on Criminal Justice to the change which the national character of the Burmese is undergoing under British rule deserves prominent notice. It is as follows :—‘The habit of gambling is said to be national, and that of opium-smoking, though rare, yet increasing with the influx of foreigners, and probably with a growing laxity in reverence for the high morality of the Buddhist religion. Gambling leads to theft, dacoity, and other crimes; it is not easy to stop it by mere restrictive measures.’ To opium-smoking must be added drunkenness, for both are acknowledged to be increasing *pari passu*. This is a social question of deep importance, in regard to which educated and intelligent natives throughout the provinces are being consulted, with a view to remedial measures of a practical kind.”

Report on the Administration of British Burma,
 during 1877-78, Summary, p. 13.

³ See Report, East India Finance, 1871, page 235.

It is therefore clear that India, the source of supply, cannot plead that she produces opium under the impression that it is a benefit to the world. Turn now to the supreme authority from which the Indian Government derives its powers. What does the British Government itself think of opium? An Act of Parliament, passed "to regulate the sale of poisons," dated 31st July, 1868, cited as the Pharmacy Act, gives the answer. There, in the schedule of poisons, we read "opium and all preparations of opium or of poppies." It is notorious that the medical profession of this country is utterly opposed to the use of opium by the public, wishing to confine it entirely to medical use. Sir Benjamin Brodie wrote:—

Opium declared
poison by Act of
Parliament.

"However valuable opium may be when employed as an article of medicine, it is impossible for any one who is acquainted with the subject to doubt that the habitual use of it is productive of the most pernicious consequences, destroying the healthy action of the digestive organs, weakening the powers of the mind as well as the body, and rendering the individual who indulges himself in it a worse than useless member of society. I cannot but regard those who promote the use of opium as an article of luxury as inflicting a most serious injury on the human race."

The present President of the Royal College of Physicians, Dr. James Risdon Bennett, permits me to say that he heartily endorses Sir Benjamin Brodie's opinion. If proof of a notorious fact were necessary, the recent correspondence in the *Times*, and other newspapers, under the heading, "Abuse of Narcotics," urging the need of giving greater stringency to the provisions of the Pharmacy Act to prevent the public from procuring opium and chloral, is evidence that the opinion of the medical profession is utterly opposed to the extra-medical indulgence in the drug.

Wherever the use of opium as a luxury is known, there it is, without qualification, condemned. In Europe, in the United States, in Egypt, in Turkey, in independent Burma, in Siam, in China, in Japan—whether the drug be eaten, drunk, or smoked, everywhere the experience of mankind condemns the practice, and their moral sense pronounces the indulgence a vice. The case of Japan is remarkable. In 1858, Lord Elgin, being then in process of negotiating that Treaty with China by which we compelled the Chinese to admit opium, passed across to Japan, and made our first Treaty with the Tycoon. In that Treaty it is expressly stipulated that the importation of opium into Japan shall be totally prohibited. Almost at

Use of Opium uni-
versally condemned.

Importation into
Japan prohibited.

the same moment a British Ambassador signed two treaties, one compelling a reluctant nation to admit opium, the other recognizing the right of a neighbouring nation to shut it out! It becomes, therefore, our duty to inquire whether there is anything so peculiar in the constitution or circumstances of the Chinese that they, and they alone of all mankind, can consume, harmlessly or beneficially, what is a poison to every other race.

Opium-smoking
condemned by the
Chinese.

The apologists for the trade contend that there is something in the temperament, climate, or food, of the Chinese, which does make the drug comparatively innocuous to them. It is, however, an important feature of the case, that the most ardent advocate for the trade has never been able to quote a single Chinese authority for this assertion. Opium-smoking began in China about 1750. In 1799, the Emperor Kang He condemned the habit as pernicious in the highest degree, and absolutely prohibited the entrance of the drug. From that opinion the Government of China has never swerved to this day, and that opinion is universally prevalent amongst all classes of the community. Edict after edict has forbidden the import and use of the drug, and drastic methods have been used to extirpate the vice.

Chinese opposition
to the trade.

In 1839, after repeated expostulations, commands, and threats vainly addressed to the opium-smugglers during the seven preceding years, a Chinese High Commissioner, sent down from Peking to Canton to stamp out the trade, seized British-owned opium, which was lying in Chinese waters, to the value of nearly two millions sterling, and poured the whole of it into the sea. Hence our first war with China, known in history as the opium war. At the close of this war, during the negotiations for a treaty, the British Plenipotentiary endeavoured to induce the Emperor Taou-Kwang to legalize the trade, pointing out that China could derive a considerable revenue from it; but Taou-Kwang unhesitatingly refused the proposition. From 1800 to 1842 all the opium had entered China in violation of the laws of the country. From 1842 again to 1860 the smuggling was resumed. In 1860, Lord Elgin's treaty, the tariff of which includes opium as an article admissible under duty, was ratified in Peking, which was then in the power of the British and French allied forces.

It seems superfluous under these circumstances, and with all the antecedents of the trade fresh in memory, to adduce evidence that

this legalization of the import of opium was no voluntary concession.

The "legalization" of the trade was forced upon China.

We have the clearest acknowledgments on all sides that the whole treaty was forced upon China, and certainly this most obnoxious provision cannot escape the compulsory character of all the rest. The Chinese Commissioner, Kweilang, pleading with Lord Elgin for some forbearance as to carrying into execution certain of the articles, wrote as follows :—

"When the Chinese Commissioner negotiated a treaty with your Excellency at Tientsin, British vessels of war were lying in that port; there was a pressure of an armed force, a state of excitement and alarm, and the Treaty had to be signed at once without a moment's delay. Deliberation was out of the question; the Commissioners had no alternative but to accept the conditions forced upon them."

Correspondence relative to Lord Elgin's Mission, p. 408-9.

Lord Elgin himself freely acknowledges the correctness of this description of the situation :—

"The concessions obtained in the treaty from the Chinese Government are not in themselves extravagant, but in the eyes of the Chinese Government they amount to a revolution. *They have been extorted therefore from its fears.*"

Blue Book, p. 348.

Sir Rutherford Alcock, the late British Minister at Peking, confirms this view :—

"To keep as clear as possible of all foreign governments is a very natural desire on the part of those who have thrice in a single generation had objectionable treaties imposed upon them at the point of the bayonet."

Our present Minister in the Chinese metropolis, Sir Thomas Wade, has expressed himself most emphatically to the same purport :—

"Nothing that has been gained was received from the free will of the Chinese. The concessions made to us have been from first to last extorted against the conscience of the nation, in defiance, that is to say, of the moral convictions of its educated men—not merely of the office-holders whom we call mandarins, and who are numerically but a small proportion of the educated class, but of the millions who are saturated with a knowledge of the history and philosophy of their country."

This confession of eminent witnesses, whose natural bias would be to conceal a truth so discreditable to our country, establishes beyond doubt this important fact, that although the opium trade has, at the moment, a legal standing in China, it is morally in no more defensible a position than when it was a smuggling trade. The only difference is that before

1860 opium was illegally introduced into China by private adventurers, while since 1860 it has been forced into China by the open support of the military and naval power of Great Britain. The crime is the same, only now it is directly committed by the whole nation instead of by a part.

The last Chinese protest against opium.

There is one loophole of escape from this humiliating conclusion which has yet to be closed up. It might be plausibly alleged that, unhappily enough, owing to faults on both sides, all our intercourse with China, political and commercial, rests upon this melancholy basis of devastating wars and compulsory treaties, but that this painful fact proves nothing of a specially compulsory character in the legalization of the opium branch of our commerce. This loophole is effectually closed by more recent events. The treaty of Tientsin contains a provision empowering both parties to propose modifications in it at the expiration of each decade of years. In 1869 Sir R. Alcock and the Chinese Government held lengthened negotiations for this purpose, in the course of which Prince Kung and the Chinese Foreign Office, both verbally and in writing, urged and entreated the abolition of this obligation to admit opium into their land. The despatch ought to be read as a whole, but we quote one extract, more than sufficient for our present purpose :—

“The Chinese merchant supplies your country with his goodly tea and silk, conferring thereby a benefit upon her; but the English merchant empisons China with pestilent opium. Such conduct is unrighteous. Who can justify it? What wonder if officials and people say that *England is wilfully working out China's ruin*, and has no real friendly feeling for her. The wealth and generosity of England is spoken of by all; she is anxious to prevent and anticipate all injury to her commercial interest. How is it, then, she can hesitate to remove an acknowledged evil? Indeed, it cannot be that England still holds to this evil business, earning the hatred of the officials and people of China, and making herself a reproach among the nations, because she would lose a little revenue were she to forfeit the cultivation of the poppy! The writers hope that his Excellency will memorialize his Government to give orders in India and elsewhere to substitute the cultivation of cereals or cotton. Were both nations to rigorously prohibit the growth of the poppy, both the traffic in and the consumption of opium might alike be put an end to.”—Report, East India Finance, 1871, p. 268.

Sir Rutherford Alcock took that despatch to Calcutta, and laid it before the Viceroy of India and his Council, telling them,—

“He had no doubt that the abhorrence expressed by the Government and

people of China for opium, as destructive to the Chinese nation, was genuine and deep-seated, and he was also quite convinced that the Chinese Government could, if it pleased, carry out its threat of developing cultivation to any extent. On the other hand, he believed that so strong was the popular feeling on the subject, that if Britain would give up the opium revenue and suppress the cultivation in India, the Chinese Government would have no difficulty in suppressing it in China, except in the province of Yunnan, where its authority is in abeyance."

Calcutta Opium Papers, Addendum to Appendix IV., p. 10.

The Viceroy and Council, as we have seen above, met the Chinese despatch with a resolution to increase this export by an additional 12,000 chests. Sir R. Alcock then brought the despatch to London, and read it to the Select Committee of the House of Commons. Its final resting-place is, we suppose, a pigeon-hole in the Foreign Office, but, at least, it has done its duty in warning the British nation that China never has for one moment condoned our offence in forcing opium upon her.

Evidence of Sir R.
Alcock.

After reading the Chinese despatch, Sir Rutherford Alcock was examined by the House of Commons' Committee, and his replies make it clear that China submits to receive our opium only under compulsion.

"5809. Now, is there anything in our treaties *to force them to take our opium*?—Yes, it is put in the tariff of articles of import.

5810. Then they are bound to allow the free import of opium?—That was a condition introduced into the treaty which Lord Elgin made.

5811. *Mr. Candlish.*] But we do not enforce the purchase?—Not the purchase, but they cannot prohibit the import of opium; it is among the admitted articles on the tariff.

5812. *Mr. J. B. Smith.*] Then, notwithstanding that the Chinese Government are so sensible of the demoralization of their people caused by the import of opium, they cannot prevent our sending it there; *we force them by treaty to take it from us*?—That is so, in effect.

5813. *Chairman.*] We have *forced* the Government to enter into a treaty to allow their subjects to take it?—Yes, precisely.

5814. *Mr. J. B. Smith.*] Is it any wonder that the Chinese Government complain of our conduct in that respect?—No, I do not think it is any wonder.

5865. *Sir C. Wingfield.*] But suppose the Chinese Government were to say, "We decline to admit opium; we will not renew the treaty except on the condition of excluding opium altogether?"—I think they could only do that on the same principle as that on which Prince Gortchakoff declared that Russia would not submit to the continued neutralization of the Black Sea: *they must be prepared to fight for it.*

This evidence of Her Majesty's then Minister Plenipotentiary, who had been engaged in debating with the Chinese statesmen in respect to the revision of the treaty, makes it quite clear that in a most literal sense Great Britain does force opium into China.

The Chefoo Convention.

All efforts to procure abolition of the trade having proved fruitless, the Chinese, without abandoning their protest, endeavoured to secure an indirect check on the trade by shutting up avenues for smuggling, and so making the imposition of higher *li-kin*⁴ duties possible. Hence the following clause of the Chefoo Convention of 1876 :—

"3. On opium, Sir Thomas Wade will move his Government to sanction an arrangement different from that affecting other imports. British merchants, when opium is brought into port, will be obliged to have it taken cognizance of by the customs, and deposited in bond, either in a warehouse or a receiving hulk, until such time as there is a sale for it. The importer will then pay the tariff duty upon it, and the purchasers the *li-kin*; in order to the prevention of the evasion of the duty, the amount of *li-kin* to be collected will be decided by the different Provincial Governments, according to the circumstances of each."

Convention signed at Chefoo, 13 Sept., 1876, Sect. III., Clause 3.

Three years have elapsed, and still that clause of the Convention is unratified; nor does there appear to be the slightest probability that Her Majesty's Government will consent to ratify. In reply to Lord Carnarvon, on May 9, 1879, the Marquis of Salisbury explained, that to ratify this clause would be to give China power to levy prohibitive duties on the drug; and that therefore the present facilities for smuggling must be maintained. Not to leave any doubts about this, let us read his Lordship's own words :—

"With respect to *li-kin*, it is not the ordinary taxation of the country; it is a species of octroi levied at the boundary of every province; it is levied very much at the discretion of the provincial governors; they can raise it or lower it as they please; but there is always this security for the foreign trader, that, as long as the collection of the duty is left in the hands of Chinese officials, smuggling, when the duty becomes high, is not a very difficult matter, and therefore there is a natural check upon these provincial governors which prevents them raising *li-kin* to an extravagant amount. With respect to opium, this convention proposes what undoubtedly would be a very drastic remedy—that the collection should be placed in the same hands as that which collects the customs—that is to say, European hands. In that case *smuggling would be absolutely barred, and the tax upon opium might*

⁴ The *li-kin* is a special tax, something like an octroi.

be raised to any amount provincial governors pleased. That would be a result which practically would neutralize the policy which hitherto has been pursued by this country in respect to that drug."

It should be noted that, by "European hands," Lord Salisbury means that, under the proposed arrangement, the li-kin would be collected by the Chinese Imperial Customs Service, which is officered by Europeans and Americans in the pay of the Chinese Government. There is not, as some have supposed, any proposition that Great Britain should collect the duty for China. This Customs Service is a department of the Chinese administration, and the fact that foreigners are employed in it is a matter of private arrangement with which we have nothing to do.

Opium grown in
China.

Opium has long been produced in China, and the area of cultivation has widened considerably during the past twenty years. This fact is frequently alleged as a proof that the Chinese objection to the opium trade is insincere. But previously to the treaty of Tientsin the cultivation of the poppy was rigorously prohibited; and though these prohibitions were partially thwarted by the venality of the lower Chinese officials, the drug was held well in check until after the compulsory legalization of the foreign trade rendered it, or seemed to render it, nugatory to enforce these prohibitions any longer; even then the Chinese Government merely held its prohibitions in abeyance for a time. As Prince Kung and the Foreign Board wrote in the famous despatch already quoted:—

"There are others, again, who suggest the removal of the prohibitions against the growth of the poppy. They argue that, as there is no means of stopping the foreign (opium) trade there can be no harm, as a temporary measure, in withdrawing the prohibition on its growth. We should thus not only deprive the foreign merchant of a main source of his profits, but should increase our revenue to boot. The sovereign rights of China are, indeed, competent to this. Such a course would be practicable; and, indeed the writers cannot say that, as a last resource, it will not come to this; but they are most unwilling that such prohibition should be removed, holding as they do, that a right system of government should appreciate the beneficence of Heaven, and (seek to) remove any grievance which afflicts its people, while, to allow them to go on to destruction though an increase of revenue may result, will provoke the judgment of Heaven and the condemnation of men."

This was in 1869. Later still the terrible famines in northern China, aggravated by poppy cultivation, have produced a fresh Imperial Edict prohibiting the growth, and we hear that the poppy is being uprooted

throughout wide regions. Before the effect of this latest edict was known, a British Consul in China wrote to our Foreign Office :—

“ One thing, however, may be predicted with tolerable certainty, and that is that much less opium will be grown in Shantung, Shansi, and Honan, for the next few years at least, than has been done lately. The two famines in Shantung and Shansi following close on each other, with all the fearful suffering they entailed, have taught the agricultural population a lesson that will not soon be forgotten. *It is a widespread belief among the Chinese that these famines are a just judgment sent from Heaven for the increasing cultivation of the poppy plant.* The Imperial Government, too, has lately issued a stringent edict, inculcating in most absolute terms the observance of previous prohibitions on this subject.”

Commercial Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls in China, 1877, page 38.

The existence in China, as elsewhere, of a too numerous class, who are deterred by no considerations of morality and pity from making money out of the vice and ruin of their fellows, cannot avail to nullify the above clear evidence that both rulers and people are sincere and earnest in their desire and effort to save the empire from the deadly opium vice.

**Opium compared
with alcohol.**

A favourite and ingenious device is to mix up the anti-opium and the anti-drink cases, as if they were exactly parallel. This artifice serves two purposes; those who are impatient with the “ fanaticism ” of Sir Wilfred Lawson are easily persuaded that the cry for the suppression of the opium trade is the same thing in a Chinese dress; while on the other hand, ardent teetotallers are told that they should first carry out their principles at home, and that it would be monstrous inconsistency to deliver China from the curse of opium, while the drink curse still ravages our own land. Of course the reply is that the two cases, though in some respects similar, are in others quite unlike; and that, whatever we as a nation may think fit to do or to endure, as respects our own drinking customs, cannot justify us in compelling the Chinese to admit the Indian poison into their ports.

Besides this the two cases are in another respect not parallel. The moderate use of alcoholic beverages is believed by the majority of our people to be harmless, and even beneficial, but among the Chinese we find one unanimous chorus of testimony as to the unalleviated noxiousness of opium. Foreigners, indeed, who are responsible for the enforced import of opium, arise to tell us that the evil has been greatly exaggerated, that it is after all not worse than that which results from the drinking habits of our own people. Opium merchants, some British officials in India,

some Consuls in China, and a passing traveller or two, extenuate the evil as far as they dare. Granted, for the sake of argument, that this view of the case is according to fact, it would be fully met by the powerful retort of Mr. Henry Richard, M.P. :⁵—

“We are often told, in this House and elsewhere, that though, no doubt, opium-smoking is a great evil, it is not worse than the gin and whisky drinking that prevails among ourselves. Well, it need not be worse, and yet be bad enough. But what a strange argument to be used by a Christian nation to say :—‘There is a habit among ourselves which, according to the concurrent testimony of ministers of religion, magistrates, judges, medical men—of all who are concerned in the administration of the law, or who are caring for the health and morals of the people—is the most prolific source of disease, crime, and misery, and what we force on the Chinese is not much worse than that ; and what right have they to complain?’”

But the analogy between drink and opium does not hold good, for, although there doubtless is a proportion among the millions who smoke opium in China who do not sink down to the lowest depths of degradation and misery, there is not in that country a general use of the drug in moderation, with a good conscience, and a belief in its harmlessness, such as prevails in England with regard to alcohol and tobacco. Sir Thomas Wade unhesitatingly declares :—

“It is to me vain to think otherwise of the use of the drug in China than as of a habit many times more pernicious, nationally speaking, than the gin and whisky drinking which we deplore at home. It takes possession more insidiously, and keeps its hold to the full as tenaciously. I know no case of radical cure. It has insured, in every case within my knowledge, the steady descent, moral and physical, of the smoker ; and it is so far a greater mischief than drink, that it does not, by external evidence of its effect, expose its victim to the loss of repute which is the penalty of habitual drunkenness.”—Correspondence respecting Treaty of Tientsin, page 432.

Dr. Dudgeon, a medical missionary, residing in Peking, who for many years has made this subject a study, altogether disbelieves in what is called “moderate” opium-smoking. He thus describes the wretched victim of the vice :—

“Once habituated to the drug, everything will be endured rather than its privation. The pipe becomes the smoker’s very life, and to satisfy the inexorable demands of the tyrant craving there is nothing to which he will not stoop. In the case of poverty the wretched victim is driven to the perpetration of crime in order to secure the pipe. Time, wealth, energies

⁵ Debate in the House of Commons, 27th June, 1876.

self-respect, self-control, honesty, truthfulness, honour, are all sacrificed at the flicker of the opium-lamp."—*Friend of China*, June, 1876.

It must, however, be carefully borne in mind, that even if opium is not quite so black as it has been painted, this does not excuse our compelling China to receive the drug. In that connexion the important inquiry is, not what do we, but what do they, believe concerning its effects? In the words of Mr. Justice Fry:—

"I believe, but I will not now urge, that opium is a poison, and that it ruins the bodies and souls of thousands of men. For my line of thought, no such proposition is needful; it is enough that the Chinese Government honestly objected to it. But I will carry my argument a step further, and without discussing whether some men can eat opium without harm, or whether it acts first on the mind or the body, or whether it is worse than gin or not so bad, this I will say, almost without fear of contradiction, that opium is a drug of such a character that the Chinese Government were at liberty, if they so determined, to hold it to be a poison, and that the Indian Government and English diplomacy had no right to say, 'You shall not hold it a poison.'"

Summing up of
the argument.

The following facts, we believe, have been demonstrated beyond the power of cavil:—

1. The British Government is the direct producer for the sake of gain, of a drug, the use of which is the cause of an immense amount of misery, disease, crime, and death.
2. The British Government is at this present time forcing this drug into the markets of a people, with whom we have treaties of peace and friendship, regardless of the fearful harm the drug produces, and deaf to the repeated remonstrances and prayers of a nation crying out against this unparalleled oppression.

Review of the
apologies for the
trade.

Some of the apologies for the trade have already been noticed, but let us now pass in review the formal defences of the existing system which have been offered by responsible persons. Within the last ten years the whole subject has been thrice debated in the House of Commons; ⁶ a deputation ⁷ has elicited from the Marquis of Salisbury an expression of his

⁶ On Sir Wilfred Lawson's motion, May 10, 1870; on Mr. Mark J. Stewart's, 25th June, 1875; and on that of Mr. H. Richard, 27th June, 1876.

⁷ 21st Feb. 1876.

views; and the Chefoo Convention has been twice,^s though imperfectly in the absence of information still withheld, discussed in the House of Lords. Throughout all these discussions the attack and defence occupy pretty much the same ground, and employ similar arguments respectively. The assailants insist that both the trade in itself and the upholding of the trade by our Government are utterly wrong in principle, and cruelly unjust to China; at the same time, they contend that the wrong is also inexpedient, the origin of war, a hindrance to beneficial trade in British manufactures, a barrier to the establishment of friendly relations with China, a peril to India as encouraging those in charge of that country to rely on an unsound and precarious source of revenue. On the other hand, the apologists make no pretence of defending the existing system on the grounds of right and fair-dealing. Lord Salisbury frankly admitted to the deputation, "I feel that there are inconveniences of principle connected with it (the Bengal monopoly), which would have prevented any government in the present day from introducing it." Mr. Bourke said in the House of Commons, "The opium question had often been debated in the House, and he had never heard any one say aught in favour of the opium traffic from a moral point of view."

Fallacious Arguments.

This being the case, no one will be surprised to find that the arguments employed to blunt the edge of the attack are more ingenious than cogent. Baseless assertions and errors as to fact are frequent, against which the plain and straightforward statement of the case above given will be a sufficient antidote. One or two notable specimens of these may be quoted. In 1870, Sir Charles Wingfield said, "It was, surely, taking rather too exalted a view of international duty to hold ourselves bound to be more solicitous for the health and morals of the Chinese people than the Chinese were themselves. The people of China would have opium anyhow." Sir C. Wingfield evidently knew nothing of the negotiations between Prince Kung and Sir Rutherford Alcock, which took place the previous year, nor of the subsequent efforts of Sir Rutherford to induce the Viceroy of India to concede something to the Chinese supplications. Again, Sir Charles argues: "The consumption of opium was said to produce physical deterioration. How was that reconciled with the fact that China has such a teeming and industrious population?" To which the single reply is, that the greater part of the "teeming and industrious popula-

^s Introduced by the Earl of Aberdeen, 23rd July, 1878; by the Earl of Carnarvon, 9th May, 1879.

tion" of China do *not* smoke opium. Only an unascertained proportion, a large proportion, but still only a percentage of the whole, are addicted to the vice. The use of opium in China is notoriously opposed to honest industry, and the opium-smoking family is said to become extinct in the third generation. Again, Mr. D. Dalrymple asserted that "the Chinese now allowed the growth of the poppy in their own dominions, and they sought to impose a heavy duty only in order to protect what might be called the opium interest in China." The Chinese Government has never directly allowed the growth of the poppy (though for a time in some places the laws against it were not rigidly enforced); and if protection of the opium interest were their object, to uproot the plant, as they are doing, is a strange method of promoting it. Only one more of these wild fictions: in 1875, Lord George Hamilton gravely stated in Parliament that "there could be no question that the Chinaman who smokes moderately can do an amount of work which no native of any other country could perform." This statement is simply ridiculous. It implies that the Chinese coolie could beat the English navy—an assumption which no one who has resided in the East will easily accept; and stranger still, that the Chinaman who uses opium excels his own countryman who does not! The fact is, that the Chinaman who uses opium cannot work without it; and the best that can be said for the drug is that if he uses no large amount, and can also obtain enough good food, opium-smoking does not immediately prostrate his strength.

Mr. Gladstone's
defence of the
trade.

Instead of following each of these apologists into every hole and corner of his speech, let us take up the defence, delivered in his place in Parliament, by the most illustrious of them all. In 1870 Mr. Gladstone, then Prime Minister, cast his mighty shield over the threatened opium revenue. Whatever can be said in excuse of the thing he has said better than any one else, and a review of his arguments will dispose of all that can be advanced on that side. In 1840 no voice more eloquently and more unsparingly condemned the first China War than that of Mr. Gladstone. He then said,—

"They gave you notice to abandon your contraband trade. When they found that you would not, they had a right to drive you from their coasts on account of your obstinacy in persisting in this infamous and atrocious traffic. You allowed your agent to aid and abet those who were concerned in carrying on that trade; and I do not know how it can be urged as a crime against the Chinese that they refused provisions to those who refused

obedience to their laws whilst residing within their territories. A war more unjust in its origin, a war more calculated to cover this country with permanent disgrace, I do not know, and I have not read of. The right hon. gentleman opposite spoke of the British flag waving in glory at Canton. That flag is hoisted to protect an infamous contraband traffic; and if it were never hoisted except as it is now hoisted on the coast of China, we should recoil from its sight with horror. Although the Chinese were undoubtedly guilty of much absurd phraseology, of no little ostentatious pride, and of some excess, justice, in my opinion, is with them; and whilst they, the Pagans, the semi-civilized barbarians, have it on their side, we, the enlightened and civilized Christians, are pursuing objects at variance both with justice and with religion." ^a

Again, in 1857, Mr. Gladstone joined with the Earl of Derby, Mr. Disraeli, Sir James Graham, Richard Cobden, John Bright, and all the most eminent men in both Houses of Parliament, in denouncing the second China War, and compelling Lord Palmerston to dissolve and appeal to the country. It is strange, then, to hear him in 1870 allude to these things as though they had no connexion whatever with the present opium trade. These are his words:—

"But that state of things departed once and for all when the Chinese Government arrived at the wise resolution that, under the circumstances of the case, it was not possible for them to struggle against an appetite so strong, and a tendency so decided as that which possessed a large portion of the Chinese people; and consequently they determined to deal with opium as a commercial commodity, and to admit it into the country upon payment of a duty."

All this is simply the reverse of the fact. The "wise resolution" and consequent "determination" of the Chinese Government never existed out of dreamland. Mr. Gladstone must have had some supposed authority for thus speaking, and the only imaginable way of accounting for it is that some official in the India Office, to whom he applied for information, had first deluded himself on the subject, and then deluded the chief of the Government. To show how utterly contrary Mr. Gladstone's soothing dream was to the hard reality, we have only to point to the date; he spoke in 1870, while the expostulation of Prince Kung, already more than once referred to, was written the year before. The opium trade is morally and equitably exactly on the same ground now as it was in the years when Mr. Gladstone denounced it. This being indubitably established, one may hope that, should Mr. Gladstone ever

^a *Vide* "Hansard," third series, vol. liii., p. 818.

again direct the affairs of the nation, he will not forget to carry out his own principles, and do justice to China.

The way thus being cleared by the simple process of reversing the facts, Mr. Gladstone proceeded pleasantly to banter Sir Wilfred Lawson on his teetotal views, and to place opium in the same category as alcohol and tobacco :—

“I affirm,” said Mr. Gladstone, “that if we are to denounce the use of opium as something which is universally, essentially, and irretrievably bad, that must be done after it has been proved that the use of opium is to be broadly distinguished from the use of every other stimulant, a point which is not settled yet.”

Here is another error as to fact. The Pharmacy Act of 1868 furnishes the broad distinction Mr. Gladstone desiderated. Alcohol and tobacco are not classed as poisons in the schedule of that Act. Opium and all preparations from the poppy are there pronounced to be poisons. The point is settled so far as the united authority of Queen, Lords, and Commons can settle anything.

The next argument is that the opium revenue is an immense gain to India :—

“This is one of the most remarkable cases which the whole fiscal history of the world presents. I do not suppose there is, or ever has been, a country—probably there never has been another country in the world—in which £6,000,000 of its revenue has been derived from a particular article, of which you could say with so close an approximation to the truth, without any violation whatever of political justice, that the £6,000,000 was virtually and substantially paid by the inhabitants of another country who did not complain of the burden.”

Even while he was uttering these words, a suspicion must have intruded into the speaker’s mind, that his information might be defective, or how shall we account for the cautious qualification, “with so close an approximation to the truth”? As our readers are aware, Mr. Gladstone was entirely misinformed. It would be hard to find in the whole history of the modern world a more flagrant violation of political justice than this of the opium trade; and the complaints of the Chinese could not be expressed in plainer and more indignant language. The following argument carries us to India :—

“Again, until you have proved that this drug is wholly intolerable and ought to be absolutely proscribed as productive of unmixed mischief, you have no moral right to deprive a considerable portion of the people of

India, who are engaged in the cultivation of it, of what is probably their only means of subsistence."

But the Indian Government, whether it has the moral right or no, does actually prohibit ninety-nine out of every hundred of its subjects from cultivating the poppy. In the case of those who receive licences to grow opium, there is a grave doubt, justified by no less an authority than that of Sir William Muir, whether they do so voluntarily, or under compulsion. But assuming that in places where they have long been accustomed to it, the ryots are willing participants in the business, there is no reason to suppose that they would be any losers by its withdrawal, beyond a temporary inconvenience. The price paid to them for the drug is fixed by the Indian Government, not in their interest, but in its own; and though the trade pays enormously, the Government engrosses nearly the whole of the profits. The chest of opium which costs the Government, all charges included, £30, when delivered in Calcutta, is sold by auction at £120, on the average. If the Indian Government were to abandon the trade, and it should appear, after examination, that some compensation ought to be paid to the ryots, the sum required would be insignificant, compared with the immense loss involved in a total surrender of the opium profits by the Government.

The loss to the Indian Revenue.

This brings us to the only real solid argument against abandonment of an otherwise utterly indefensible policy, the revenue difficulty, which was most forcibly put by Mr. Grant Duff:—

"Let him suppose for a moment that the House were to listen to the proposal of his hon. friend. One of three things would result from his maleficent benevolence—either the loss occasioned by the destruction of this great feeder of its prosperity would have to be made up by obtaining from some other quarter an equally large subsidy in aid of India; or an enormous new tax would have to be levied upon India, or the development of the resources of that country—so full of resources as yet imperfectly developed—would have to be proceeded with at a rate so slow as to drive all its well-wishers in Europe and all its most intelligent inhabitants to despair."

When it is put in black and white, this argument looks so ugly that it is not surprising that so many dummies were set up to draw off attention from it. In plain English, Mr. Grant Duff decides we have no hope of the development of India except from the opium revenue. This revenue is a tax, a blood-tax if you will, paid by the Chinese; with this we build our schools, construct our railways, pay our bishops. True, the drug is ruining China, but we cannot afford to consider that.

We must continue to impoverish and demoralize and murder myriads of Chinese, for in no other way can we get the money to improve the condition of our Indian subjects.

The demand for a substitute for the opium revenue.

It is important that the naked truth should be brought home to the hearts and consciences of Englishmen and Scotchmen, and Irishmen. They may be told that to expose the cruel cynicism of the proceeding does not alter the facts, that India wants the opium profits and would be bankrupt without it. Honest men will indignantly reply that every other civilized country in the world manages to subsist without raising taxes from the foreigner, and India can, ought, and must do the same; that it is not their business to point out the way in which this can be accomplished, but the business of the Government for the time being, and if the Government cannot do this, then the sooner they yield their seats to other men the better. The assailant of the opium revenue is not bound to indicate a substitute, and until the defenders have openly renounced all sham apologies and candidly acknowledged the iniquity of the thing and avowed a desire to give it up, it would be of small avail for him to do so.

It is premature to discuss the revenue difficulty before Parliament has shown a disposition to deal honestly with the whole question. But two things may be remarked on this point. First, those who contend that the Chinese must not be oppressed and poisoned for the sake of the Indian revenue, are equally opposed to oppressing the poor ryots of India with intolerable taxation in order to relieve China from injustice. Our despotically-governed fellow-subjects in the Indian peninsula are not responsible for the opium trade, and the way of repentance must not be sought at their expense. Secondly, the revenue difficulty, though serious, need not be regarded as insuperable. According to the telegraphic report of the Indian Budget just received (February 25),¹ as summarized by the *Times*, India can afford to pay, during this and the next year, nine millions sterling for the expenses of the Afghan war, and the railways made in connexion with it, "without the imposition of new taxation, with some important remissions of existing burdens, and without any necessity for borrowing money." Nine millions in two years, four and a half millions per year, exceeds the average receipts from the Bengal monopoly during the past ten years; and therefore the maintenance of peace would enable the Indian Government to dispense with one branch of the opium revenue at a stroke. If, however,

¹ See Appendix VI., p. 35.

Sir John Strachey's budget statement should prove, on closer examination, not so promising as it looks at first sight, it at least justifies us in saying that no one has a right to pronounce the revenue difficulty insurmountable until there has been a special Parliamentary investigation of the subject.

The opium trade injurious to British commerce.

But some important subsidiary considerations may be here suggested. The opium revenue, however profitable to India, is injurious to Great Britain. Mr. Samuel S. Mander, himself a manufacturer, says :²—

"It was a legitimate expectation, cherished from the beginning of our intercourse with China, that an immense trade would ultimately spring up between that country on the one hand, and England and India on the other. But, after a hundred years of this intercourse, what are the facts? In 1874 with twenty-one seaports open to us, in addition to the possession of Hong Kong, England sent to China, with its 400 millions of inhabitants (one-third of the human race), less than eight millions worth of goods out of a total export to all countries of £250,000,000; that is, less than fourpence per head per annum of its population; while the Australian Colonies, with only four millions of people (one-hundredth part of the population of China), took fourteen millions worth of our goods, or just £3 10s. per head per annum. But in 1872-73 the exports from India to China were worth twelve millions sterling, of which, however, opium (85,000 chests) counted for ten and a half millions, leaving one and a half millions only for legitimate trade."

In consequence of the publication of this pamphlet some of the London private bankers last year addressed a letter to the Chambers of Commerce throughout the country, in which they say,—

"We lay stress on this outstanding fact that English industry is practically shut out from the market which of all others seems to offer the greatest possibilities of increase and expansion; and this not from any unwillingness on the part of the Government or people of China to receive our manufactures, but through the calamitous operation of a monopoly which exists for the sake of bringing in revenue to the Indian Exchequer. The purchasing power of China seems paralyzed by the opium trade, whilst the Indian budget rests upon a basis which must give way the moment China is strong enough to assert herself."

Drawbacks to the gain of the Indian Government.

There are also drawbacks to the gainfulness of the opium trade to India. The Chinese war cost India, according to Sir John Lubbock, six and a half millions

² "Our Opium Trade with China," p. 31.

sterling.* But most serious for India is the consideration that this great item of receipt may possibly fail from causes beyond our control. Mr. Gladstone himself is impressed by this consideration, for in the last debate on the Indian budget he warned the House :—

“Nearly all that is said upon this subject appears to be based upon the assumption that Indian revenue is in the main like British revenue, that it is as much within our control, and that we can equally assure its continuance and reckon upon its solidity. But we have no right to reckon upon it as if it were a domestic revenue, because it is so largely dependent on the policy and legislation of a foreign country. It is all very well to say there is something in the quality of Indian opium which will ensure the demand for it, but we ought not as prudent men to found our hopes of a revenue on such an opinion, which may at any time be falsified by improved methods of cultivation or treatment in China. The revenue from opium is not to be counted upon like the revenue from land or like that from salt, which, be it objectionable or not, is under our control. The opium revenue we may accept with more or less compunction and regret, as ministering to our present necessity, but we have no right to reckon upon its full continuance. This is one consideration that ought not to be overlooked.”

To this may be added the probability that the Chinese will not continue for ever quietly to endure the wrong we are inflicting on them, but will, when they feel themselves strong enough, insist upon their right, all compulsory treaties notwithstanding, to prohibit the entrance of the drug.

We have endeavoured to state the case with perfect truthfulness, and as calmly as burning indignation against one of the most frightful and the most monstrous instances of injustice and cruelty the world has ever seen would permit. The reader will judge for himself what Great Britain ought to do to atone for the past, and to inaugurate a better future in her relations with China. In spite of the grievous fact that our nation has proved itself capable of maintaining this iniquitous traffic for so many years, we believe that a large proportion of the people hold that there is something higher in existence than flourishing revenues and lucrative commerce. The belief in Christianity is not extinct yet, and to all Christians it must be an unspeakable shame and sorrow that this trade in poison bars the way to the progress of the Christian religion in China. Keenly will they feel

* See Manders' "Opium Trade," p. 39.

the taunt of the half-informed Chinese heathen who penned the following sentences in reference to our opium trade :—

“ When Jesus first established His kingdom, He was one who could indeed give His life to save others. Therefore He established a very great kingdom. At the present time those who say they teach according to the words of Jesus are not in heart at one with His doctrine. They certainly have not the heart of Jesus. The whole kingdom, its sovereign, ministers, and the upper and lower classes of the people, combine in acting contrary to that virtue which established this kingdom. Will not this kingdom surely decay? If Jesus knows about this, He ought to hide himself and weep.”⁴

To Members of Parliament, and candidates for that high honour, may we venture on one suggestion? You did not bring this opium traffic into existence, but it cannot continue to exist except by your connivance. Is it too much to expect that you will ask yourselves whether a seat in your country's legislature, however great the honour, is not purchased at too great an expense if you thereby become even tacit participants in this great crime against humanity?

⁴ *Friend of China*, vol. ii., p. 182.

APPENDIX.

I.

Net Opium Revenue compared with Total Net Revenue of India for each year from 1792 to 1834. From the Calcutta Blue Book—Finance and Revenue Accounts, 1875. Part III., Account Nos. 1, 2, and 5. [For 1834 et seq. see next Table.]

| Year. | Net Opium Revenue. | Total Net Revenue of India. | Year. | Net Opium Revenue. | Total Net Revenue of India. |
|-----------|--------------------|-----------------------------|-----------|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| | £ | £ | | £ | £ |
| 1792-1793 | 190,654 | 4,979,000 | 1813-1814 | 856,309 | 7,314,683 |
| 1793-1794 | 202,262 | 5,365,133 | 1814-1815 | 1,020,565 | 13,122,066 |
| 1794-1795 | 228,117 | 5,446,642 | 1815-1816 | 941,501 | 12,962,580 |
| 1795-1796 | 47,984 | 5,187,077 | 1816-1817 | 823,105 | 13,571,211 |
| 1796-1797 | 39,696 | 5,175,929 | 1817-1818 | 784,348 | 13,949,576 |
| 1797-1798 | 64,378 | 4,970,412 | 1818-1819 | 741,593 | 14,750,218 |
| 1798-1799 | 112,509 | 5,257,505 | 1819-1820 | 696,318 | 14,253,938 |
| 1799-1800 | 274,157 | 5,607,807 | 1820-1821 | 1,264,329 | 15,200,586 |
| 1800-1801 | 267,121 | 5,593,304 | 1821-1822 | 935,884 | 15,179,462 |
| 1801-1802 | 273,531 | 6,058,977 | 1822-1823 | 1,352,134 | 15,555,311 |
| 1802-1803 | 451,664 | 6,477,172 | 1823-1824 | 740,741 | 14,480,440 |
| 1803-1804 | 390,973 | 6,845,806 | 1824-1825 | 735,306 | 13,818,689 |
| 1804-1805 | 640,099 | 7,162,102 | 1825-1826 | 379,218 | 14,394,454 |
| 1805-1806 | 596,538 | 7,286,506 | 1826-1827 | 1,202,595 | 15,285,449 |
| 1806-1807 | 384,565 | 6,763,722 | 1827-1828 | 1,393,519 | 15,180,755 |
| 1807-1808 | 696,963 | 8,202,057 | 1828-1829 | 1,421,922 | 15,316,708 |
| 1808-1809 | 494,058 | 8,048,160 | 1829-1830 | 1,289,391 | 15,175,432 |
| 1809-1810 | 479,080 | 7,966,297 | 1830-1831 | 1,183,185 | 15,059,905 |
| 1810-1811 | 839,809 | 7,649,031 | 1831-1832 | 1,147,839 | 14,601,039 |
| 1811-1812 | 836,945 | 7,618,948 | 1832-1833 | 1,208,836 | 14,186,791 |
| 1812-1813 | 641,888 | 7,305,475 | 1833-1834 | 1,070,629 | 13,899,725 |

II.

Net Opium Revenue (Distinguishing Receipts from the Monopoly and from Duty on Malwa Opium), compared with the Total Net Revenue of India, from 1834-35. From the Calcutta Blue Book, Finance and Revenue Accounts, 1875. Part III. Accounts No. 2 and No. 64.

| Years. | Net Opium Revenue. | | | Total Net Revenue of India. |
|----------|--------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------------------------|
| | Bengal. | Bombay. | Total. | |
| | £ | £ | £ | £ |
| 1834-35 | 694,279 | 144,171 | 838,450 | 14,392,309 |
| 1835-36 | 1,320,162 | 171,845 | 1,492,007 | 14,336,985 |
| 1836-37 | 1,334,097 | 200,871 | 1,534,968 | 16,116,431 |
| 1837-38 | 1,436,724 | 149,721 | 1,586,445 | 15,953,783 |
| 1838-39 | 698,799 | 254,331 | 953,130 | 16,425,885 |
| 1839-40 | 326,076 | 11,701 | 337,777 | 15,530,757 |
| 1840-41 | 649,632 | 224,645 | 874,277 | 16,323,563 |
| 1841-42 | 803,867 | 214,899 | 1,018,766 | 17,190,613 |
| 1842-43 | 1,322,343 | 251,238 | 1,576,581 | 17,933,635 |
| 1843-44 | 1,675,948 | 348,878 | 2,024,826 | 18,593,560 |
| 1844-45 | 1,808,345 | 372,943 | 2,181,288 | 18,685,119 |
| 1845-46 | 2,207,726 | 595,624 | 2,803,350 | 19,319,036 |
| 1846-47 | 2,279,339 | 606,863 | 2,886,202 | 20,071,289 |
| 1847-48 | 1,291,529 | 371,855 | 1,663,384 | 19,369,432 |
| 1848-49 | 1,958,256 | 887,507 | 2,845,763 | 20,082,202 |
| 1849-50 | 2,800,797 | 729,484 | 3,530,281 | 22,202,898 |
| 1850-51 | 2,055,827 | 694,521 | 2,750,348 | 21,374,223 |
| 1851-52 | 2,011,163 | 1,128,083 | 3,139,246 | 21,693,687 |
| 1852-53 | 2,601,043 | 1,116,889 | 3,717,932 | 23,374,748 |
| 1853-54 | 2,394,998 | 964,022 | 3,359,020 | 22,691,319 |
| 1854-55 | 2,232,411 | 1,101,191 | 3,333,602 | 23,529,289 |
| 1855-56 | 2,951,612 | 1,010,365 | 3,961,977 | 25,375,580 |
| 1856-57 | 2,700,712 | 1,159,677 | 3,860,389 | 26,305,111 |
| 1857-58 | 4,286,377 | 1,631,998 | 5,918,375 | 25,285,958 |
| 1858-59 | 3,898,114 | 1,448,277 | 5,346,391 | 28,759,597 |
| 1859-60 | 3,636,453 | 1,533,325 | 5,169,778 | 31,318,097 |
| 1860-61 | 3,316,613 | 2,441,679 | 5,758,292 | 34,198,019 |
| 1861-62 | 2,471,347 | 2,438,458 | 4,909,805 | 34,486,759 |
| 1862-63 | 2,959,789 | 3,239,409 | 6,199,198 | 35,926,232 |
| 1863-64 | 3,044,688 | 1,480,818 | 4,525,506 | 34,447,543 |
| 1864-65 | 2,883,542 | 2,100,882 | 4,984,424 | 35,306,234 |
| 1865-66 | 4,499,227 | 2,124,767 | 6,623,994 | 36,816,787 |
| 1866-67 | 3,873,754 | 1,851,263 | 5,725,017 | 33,434,179 |
| 1867-68 | 4,695,357 | 2,352,708 | 7,048,065 | 37,274,048 |
| 1868-69 | 4,927,150 | 1,804,180 | 6,731,330 | 36,701,536 |
| 1869-70 | 3,776,626 | 2,354,246 | 6,130,872 | 37,862,424 |
| 1870-71 | 3,632,325 | 2,398,709 | 6,031,034 | 38,719,877 |
| 1871-72 | 5,305,402 | 2,351,811 | 7,657,213 | 39,076,952 |
| 1872-73 | 4,259,162 | 2,611,261 | 6,870,423 | 38,946,763 |
| *1873-74 | 3,584,763 | 2,738,836 | 6,323,599 | 40,442,903 |
| 1874-75 | 3,264,266 | 2,950,817 | 6,215,083 | 41,059,405 |
| 1875-76 | 3,705,170 | 2,547,690 | 6,252,860 | 41,826,784 |
| 1876-77 | 3,334,338 | 2,946,475 | 6,280,813 | 39,168,627 |
| 1877-78 | 3,773,960 | 2,747,496 | 6,521,456 | 38,656,484 |

NOTE.—According to a return, printed 2nd May, 1879, the net opium revenue for 1878-79 is estimated at £7,584,062, and the total net revenue at £44,554,375.

* From 1873-74 the figures are taken from the East India Finance and Revenue Accounts, published in London.

III.

Statement of Government Opium Sales at Calcutta, and of the number of Chests of Malwa exported from 1802-3 to 1833-4. [For subsequent years see next Table.]

| Year. | Opium sold in Calcutta. | Value. | Price per Chest. | Number of Malwa Chests Exported. | Total Export. |
|-----------|-------------------------|-----------|------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|
| | Chests. | £ | £ | | |
| 1802-1803 | 3292 | 455,572 | 138 | | 3,292 |
| 1803-1804 | 2840 | 394,459 | 138 | | 2,840 |
| 1804-1805 | 3159 | 620,380 | 196 | | 3,159 |
| 1805-1806 | 3836 | 589,491 | 153 | | 3,836 |
| 1806-1807 | 4126 | 407,794 | 98 | | 4,126 |
| 1807-1808 | 4538 | 685,415 | 151 | | 4,538 |
| 1808-1809 | 4208 | 510,576 | 121 | | 4,208 |
| 1809-1810 | 4561 | 807,095 | 176 | | 4,561 |
| 1810-1811 | 4968 | 808,833 | 162 | | 4,968 |
| 1811-1812 | 4891 | 799,687 | 163 | | 4,891 |
| 1812-1813 | 4966 | 627,670 | 126 | | 4,966 |
| 1813-1814 | 4769 | 887,147 | 186 | | 4,769 |
| 1814-1815 | 3672 | 891,429 | 242 | | 3,672 |
| 1815-1816 | 4230 | 909,398 | 214 | | 4,230 |
| 1816-1817 | 4618 | 907,997 | 196 | | 4,618 |
| 1817-1818 | 3692 | 804,319 | 217 | | 3,692 |
| 1818-1819 | 3552 | 634,326 | 178 | | 3,552 |
| 1819-1820 | 4006 | 825,560 | 206 | | 4,006 |
| 1820-1821 | 4244 | 1,056,389 | 248 | 2,278 | 6,522 |
| 1821-1822 | 3293 | 1,317,631 | 400 | 6,355 | 9,648 |
| 1822-1823 | 3918 | 1,082,949 | 276 | 8,035 | 11,953 |
| 1823-1824 | 3360 | 650,861 | 193 | 7,563 | 10,923 |
| 1824-1825 | 5690 | 740,155 | 130 | 7,063 | 12,753 |
| 1825-1826 | 3810 | 888,022 | 230 | 5,605 | 9,415 |
| 1826-1827 | 6570 | 833,002 | 126 | 4,504 | 11,074 |
| 1827-1828 | 6650 | 1,122,841 | 168 | 7,709 | 14,359 |
| 1828-1829 | 7709 | 1,063,513 | 137 | 8,099 | 15,808 |
| 1829-1830 | 8778 | 1,125,576 | 128 | 12,856 | 21,634 |

These tables are compiled from *Phipps' China and Eastern Trade*, p. 232 et. seq. The tables published by the Indian Government begin at 1830 (see next page). In Macgregor's Commercial Statistics there is a table of the number of chests *exported* from Calcutta, the figures of which do not tally with those Phipps gives of chests sold in Calcutta, but the difference is small. Phipps' total sale in Calcutta from 1802 to 1834 is 166,294 chests, while Macgregor's export from Calcutta amounts to 168,431 chests. There is no return for Malwa before 1820-21. The East India Company's monopoly of Malwa began in 1818. Before that time, when the Mahrattas commanded the route to the coast, the Malwa export was small. Phipps gives the value in sicca rupees, which are taken here, according to the usual computation, as equal to two shillings each.

IV.

NUMBER of Chests of Bengal and Malwa Opium, exported to China and places beyond British India. Compiled from Finance and Revenue Accounts, published in Calcutta, by Government, in 1875. Part III., Accounts No. 65 and No. 67.

| Official Year. | From Bengal. | | | Price realized at Government Sale, per Chest. | Malwa Opium exported from Bombay to China. | Total Export. |
|----------------|--------------|------------------------|---------|---|--|---------------|
| | To China. | Singapore, Penang, &c. | Total. | | | |
| | Chests. | Chests. | Chests. | £ | Chests. | Chests. |
| 1830-31 | 5,590 | 1,526 | 7,116 | 176 | 4,610 | 11,726 |
| 1831-32 | 6,750 | 757 | 7,507 | 158 | 10,679 | 18,186 |
| 1832-33 | 7,540 | 1,845 | 9,385 | 124 | 6,698 | 16,083 |
| 1833-34 | 10,151 | 1,779 | 11,930 | 101 | 10,855 | 22,785 |
| 1834-35 | 9,480 | 1,570 | 11,050 | 111 | 6,812 | 17,862 |
| 1835-36 | 13,021 | 1,786 | 14,807 | 127 | — | — |
| 1836-37 | 10,493 | 2,241 | 12,734 | 155 | 20,882½ | 33,616½ |
| 1837-38 | 16,112 | 3,195 | 19,307 | 87 | 10,372½ | 29,679½ |
| 1838-39 | 14,499 | 3,722 | 18,221 | 53 | 17,353 | 35,574 |
| 1839-40 | 3,755 | 14,755 | 18,510 | 42 | — | — |
| 1840-41 | 5,817 | 11,593 | 17,410 | 70 | 12,022½ | 29,432½ |
| 1841-42 | 10,752 | 8,987 | 19,739 | 75 | 14,473 | 34,212 |
| 1842-43 | 11,867 | 4,651 | 16,518 | 112 | 19,369 | 35,887 |
| 1843-44 | 13,067 | 4,792 | 17,859 | 132 | 16,914 | 34,803 |
| 1844-45 | 14,709 | 4,083 | 18,792 | 132 | 18,150½ | 36,942½ |
| 1845-46 | 16,265 | 4,288 | 20,553 | 136 | 17,770 | 38,323 |
| 1846-47 | 20,668 | 4,322 | 24,990 | 123 | 17,389½ | 42,379½ |
| 1847-48 | 19,434 | 4,443 | 23,877 | 98 | 19,391 | 43,268 |
| 1848-49 | 27,870 | 4,417 | 32,287 | 90 | 21,392½ | 53,679½ |
| 1849-50 | 30,996 | 4,097 | 35,093 | 102 | 16,513 | 51,606 |
| 1850-51 | 28,892 | 4,010 | 32,902 | 95 | 19,138 | 52,040 |
| 1851-52 | 27,921 | 4,385 | 32,306 | 98 | 28,168½ | 60,474½ |
| 1852-53 | 31,433 | 4,745 | 36,178 | 110 | 24,979½ | 61,157½ |
| 1853-54 | 33,941 | 6,854 | 40,795 | 88 | 26,113½ | 66,908½ |
| 1854-55 | 43,952 | 7,469 | 51,421 | 71 | 25,958½ | 77,379½ |
| 1855-56 | 37,851 | 7,087 | 44,938 | 83 | 25,576 | 70,514 |
| 1856-57 | 36,459 | 5,982 | 42,441 | 89 | 29,846½ | 72,287½ |
| 1857-58 | 31,878 | 6,735 | 38,613 | 128 | 36,125½ | 74,738½ |
| 1858-59 | 33,858 | 827 | 34,685 | 148 | 40,849 | 75,534 |
| 1859-60 | 22,329 | 3,621 | 25,950 | 167 | 32,534 | 58,484 |
| 1860-61 | 15,688 | 3,621 | 19,309 | 192 | 43,691 | 63,000 |
| 1861-62 | 21,332 | 5,240 | 26,572 | 161 | 38,680 | 65,252 |
| 1862-63 | 25,846 | 6,815 | 32,661 | 142 | 49,485½ | 82,146½ |
| 1863-64 | 33,815 | 8,806 | 42,621 | 121 | 28,210½ | 70,831½ |
| 1864-65 | 41,719 | 8,484 | 50,203 | 93 | 34,213½ | 84,416½ |
| 1865-66 | 42,697 | 11,576 | 54,273 | 112 | 34,166½ | 88,439½ |
| 1866-67 | 37,279 | 4,478 | 41,757 | 124 | 33,081 | 74,839 |
| 1867-68 | 40,772 | 7,484 | 48,256 | 133 | 38,883 | 87,139 |
| 1868-69 | 37,985 | 6,281 | 44,266 | 137 | 30,683 | 74,949 |
| 1869-70 | 43,054 | 6,680 | 49,734 | 119 | 38,694 | 88,428 |
| 1870-71 | 40,669 | 8,054 | 48,723 | 112 | 36,436 | 85,159 |
| 1871-72 | 41,569 | 7,886 | 49,455 | 138 | 39,334½ | 88,789½ |
| 1872-73 | 34,009 | 6,476 | 40,485 | 138 | 42,369 | 82,854 |
| 1873-74 | 34,820 | 8,517 | 43,337 | 126 | 45,301 | 88,638 |
| * 1874-75 | — | — | 45,000 | 120 | 49,212 | 94,212 |
| 1875-76 | — | — | 45,510 | 125 | 42,490½ | 88,000½ |
| 1876-77 | — | — | 47,240 | 127 | 49,136 | 96,376 |
| 1877-78 | — | — | 49,500 | 126 | 45,830 | 95,330 |

* From 1874 the figures are taken from the Blue Books published in London, East India Finance and Revenue Accounts.

V.

EXTENT OF CULTIVATION, total Produce, Quantity of Opium produced, Number of Chests made for Excise, Number of Chests made for Export, Net Revenue per Chest of Bengal Opium, and Revenue per Chest on Malwa Opium. Finance and Revenue Accounts, No. 69 and No. 71.

| Year of Manufacture. | Quantity of Land cultivated with Poppy. | | Quantity of Opium produced. | Number of Akbarry Opium ³ chests made. | Number of Provision Opium ⁴ chests made. | Net Revenue per chest Bengal Opium. | Duty on Malwa Opium. |
|----------------------|---|---------|-----------------------------|---|---|-------------------------------------|----------------------|
| September to August. | Beegahs. ¹ | Acres. | Mds. ² | Chests. | Chests. | £ | £ |
| 1848-49 | 388,044 | 242,527 | 62,994 | 398½ | 35,385 | 71 | 40 |
| 1849-50 | 373,616 | 233,510 | 60,935 | 898½ | 34,419 | 64 | 40 |
| 1850-51 | 412,173 | 257,608 | 61,053 | 1,412½ | 33,563 | 83 | 40 |
| 1851-52 | 460,322 | 287,701 | 70,598 | 867 | 39,465 | 69 | 40 |
| 1852-53 | 546,031 | 341,269 | 87,457 | 1,043½ | 48,322 | 48 | 40 |
| 1853-54 | 616,257 | 385,161 | 96,278 | 1,213½ | 53,321 | 46 | 40 |
| 1854-55 | 595,711 | 372,319 | 78,796 | 1,432½ | 44,441½ | 61 | 40 |
| 1855-56 | 582,848 | 364,280 | 78,895 | 1,833½ | 43,907 | 83 | 40 |
| 1856-57 | 543,897 | 339,936 | 59,975 | 1,604½ | 32,693 | 117 | 40 |
| 1857-58 | 400,733 | 250,458 | 54,867 | 3,353½ | 27,175½ | 136 | 40 |
| 1858-59 | 467,646 | 292,279 | 41,329 | 1,668½ | 21,367 | 147 | 40 |
| 1859-60 | 434,508 | 271,567 | 41,230 | 2,182½ | 21,427 | 155 | 40 50 |
| 1860-61 | 435,337 | 272,086 | 58,168 | 3,107½ | 29,398 | 112 | 50 60 |
| 1861-62 | 621,165 | 388,228 | 75,044 | 3,019½ | 39,656 | 97 | 60 70 |
| 1862-63 | 748,693 | 467,933 | 93,583 | 3,190 | 49,727 | 61 | 70 60 |
| 1863-64 | 803,655 | 505,409 | 119,517 | 2,622 | 64,269 | 56 | 60 |
| 1864-65 | 765,185 | 478,241 | 86,276 | 2,384 | 47,785 | 72 | 60 |
| 1865-66 | 637,830 | 398,644 | 81,327 | 4,157 | 40,901 | 116 | 60 |
| 1866-67 | 702,076 | 438,798 | 93,136 | 4,596 | 48,895 | 101 | 60 |
| 1867-68 | 727,247 | 454,529 | 83,750 | 5,277 | 43,610 | 96 | 60 |
| 1868-69 | 694,340 | 433,962 | 86,019 | 4,458 | 46,894½ | 78 | 60 |
| 1869-70 | 778,331 | 486,457 | 99,124 | 2,579 | 54,072½ | 92 | 60 |
| 1870-71 | 834,035 | 521,272 | 76,739 | 3,114 | 40,981½ | 98½ | 60 |
| 1871-72 | 863,272 | 539,545 | 81,431 | 3,680½ | 42,975 | 87½ | 60 |
| 1872-73 | 828,222 | 517,639 | 88,104 | 4,292½ | 45,770 | 99 | 60 |
| 1873-74 | 729,710 | 456,069 | 103,862 | 4,360 | 54,716 | — | 60 |
| 1874-75 | 869,666 | 543,541 | 98,178 | 4,170 | 51,754 | — | 60 |
| 1875-76 | — | — | 121,887 | 3,992 | 68,051 | — | 60 |
| 1876-77 | --- | --- | 120,278 | 3,924 | 67,167 | — | 60 ⁵ |

¹ The Opium Beegah = 27,225 square feet, or $\frac{5}{8}$ of an acre.

² The Maund = 82½ lbs.

³ Akbarry Opium is opium for consumption in India.

⁴ Provision Opium is opium provided for the Export trade.

⁵ In 1877 the Malwa Export duty was raised to Rs. 650, or £65, and in 1879 it was raised to 700 Rs., or £70.

VI.

TOTAL QUANTITY OF OPIUM IMPORTED INTO CHINA DURING THE YEARS 1864-72. Compiled from published Returns of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs.

| Description. | | | Quantity. | | Value. |
|--------------|---------|---|----------------------|----------|-----------------------------|
| | | | Peculs. ¹ | Catties. | Haikwan Taels. ² |
| Malwa | } India | . | 295,730 | 97 | 127,164,317 |
| Patna | | . | 141,662 | 52 | 56,665,008 |
| Benares | | . | 75,374 | 24 | 30,149,696 |
| Persian | . | . | 9,204 | 23 | 3,773,734 |
| Turkey | . | . | 235 | 95 | 89,661 |
| Total | . | . | 522,207 | 91 | 217,842,416 |

¹ The Pecul = 100 catties = 133½ lbs. avoirdupois.

² The Haikwan Tael = 6s. 8d.

The above table shows conclusively that the opium trade is a question between China and Great Britain alone; the other countries interested in the trade, Turkey and Persia, are interested only to a very small extent. Out of a total import of more than half a million peculs in nine years, these countries together sent only 9440 peculs; not one-fiftieth of the whole.

We have not the figures to complete the above table to the present date, but the following extract from the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs for 1878 shows that the proportions of the trade are still about the same.

| IMPORT OF OPIUM INTO CHINA. | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------|------------|-----------|------------|
| 1877. | | | 1878. | |
| Description. | Quantity. | Value. | Quantity. | Value. |
| | Peculs. | Taels. | Peculs. | Taels. |
| Malwa . . . | 41,705 | 19,141,281 | 37,004 | 19,301,062 |
| Patna . . . | 15,237 | 6,139,934 | 18,588 | 6,948,522 |
| Benares . . . | 10,821 | 4,083,225 | 12,373 | 4,406,269 |
| Other kinds . . | 2,415 | 893,372 | 4,458 | 1,607,104 |
| Total . . . | 70,178 | 30,257,812 | 72,423 | 32,262,957 |

VII.

A GENERAL VIEW OF THE TRADE BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA, AND BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA.

The subjoined figures are given for the year 1875. The Indian Returns of Trade published in this country since 1875 are abbreviated, and therefore we cannot bring the figures of later dates. But the general character of the trade is unaltered :—

EXPORTS FROM INDIA TO CHINA (INCLUDING HONG KONG) IN 1875. ¹

| | | |
|------------------------------------|-------|-------------|
| Raw Cottons | value | £489,470 |
| Piece goods and Sundries | " | 346,025 |
| Opium | " | 10,862,694 |
| | | <hr/> |
| | | £11,648,189 |

IMPORTS FROM CHINA (INCLUDING HONG KONG) INTO INDIA, 1875.

| | | |
|-----------------------------|-------|------------|
| Raw Silk | value | £691,569 |
| Manufactured Silk | " | 253,108 |
| Tea | " | 120,960 |
| Sundries | " | 454,477 |
| | | <hr/> |
| | | £1,520,114 |

This shows a balance due from China to India of more than ten millions sterling, nearly the whole being for opium. China paid in gold and silver £1,334,274; ² leaving a balance due of over eight millions and a half. The average balance against China for the previous five years was £8,372,398. ³

Turning now to the ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE TRADE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM for 1875, p. 200, we find our Imports from China, including Hong Kong and Macao, were—

| | | |
|--------------------|-------|-------------|
| Silk | value | £2,711,142 |
| Tea | " | 11,454,840 |
| Sundries | " | 643,650 |
| | | <hr/> |
| | | £14,809,632 |

Our Exports to China, including Hong Kong and Macao, were—

| | | |
|----------------------------------|-------|------------|
| Cotton Yarn and Cotton | value | £6,071,319 |
| Woollens | " | 1,191,239 |
| Metals and Sundries | " | 1,673,348 |
| | | <hr/> |
| | | £8,935,906 |

Thus part of the balance which China owed to India she sent by way of England. Another part is sent by exports to the United States. China pays for Opium by exporting tea.

¹ Statement of the Trade of British India with British Possessions and Foreign Countries, for the five years 1870-71 to 1874-75 [C.—1616, pp. 216—219.]

² Ibid. pp. 15, 16.

³ Ibid. p. xxxii.

VIII.

THE PROSPECTS OF INDIAN FINANCE.

THE *Times* of Feb. 25th publishes the following Reuter's telegram:—

CALCUTTA, Feb. 24th.

"Sir John Strachey made his financial statement in the Legislative Council to-day. The results he announced to be highly favourable. In the financial year 1878-79 there was a surplus of £2,044,000, and in 1879-80 of £119,000. The Budget estimate for 1880-81 shows a surplus of £417,000. The foregoing figures are arrived at in each case after paying from the ordinary revenue all charges on account of the famine, the Afghan war, and the frontier railways. The war expenses in 1878-79 amounted to £676,000, in 1879-80 to £3,216,000, and in 1880-81 are estimated at £2,090,000. After setting off the increased railway and telegraph revenue, the total net war expenditure to the end of 1880-81 is estimated at £5,750,000. The gross expenditure in frontier railways during the present financial year will be £1,670,000, and the next year £2,270,000. The total net expenditure under this head is fixed at £3,500,000. The expenditure on productive works in 1878-79 was £3,381,000; in 1879-80, £3,700,000; and in 1880-81 will be £2,500,000, besides the outlay on the East Indian railway. During the present financial year the Council bills on India will amount to £15,750,000, and next year to £16,900,000. According to the present intention of the Government, no loans will be required during the coming year unless unforeseen events should occur; but full powers are reserved to borrow in case of need. The closing cash balances in India at the end of 1879-80 amounted to £14,193,000, and in 1880-81 are estimated at £11,444,000. The rate of exchange is estimated for next year at 1s. 8d. per rupee. The extension of taxation to official and professional classes has been abandoned for the present. Sir John Strachey considers fresh taxation undesirable under existing financial circumstances. The licence-tax, therefore, remains unaltered, except that all incomes below 500 rupees will be exempted. This exemption is tantamount to a remission of taxation to the extent of £340,000. The export duties on indigo and lac are abandoned, causing a loss to the revenue of £54,000. No export duty now remains except on rice. No change is proposed at present in the cotton duties, but the prolonged maintenance of these duties is declared to be impossible. The loss to the revenue next year from the previous remission of the cotton duties is estimated at £250,000. Notwithstanding the reduction of

the salt tax in the greater part of India, salt shows a large increase both in consumption and revenue. The principal improvement in 1879-80 compared with the estimates is shown by the following items:—Opium, £1,900,000; exchange, £1,010,000; public works (savings), £661,000; land revenue, £450,000; salt, £362,000; interest, £389,000.

Sir John Strachey announced that the Army Commission recommends important measures for increasing the efficiency of the army, combined with an estimated annual saving of £1,250,000. This amount is not credited in the Budget."

These figures are surprising. The Parliamentary Return of 2nd May, 1879, gives, as the result of the regular estimate for 1878-79, a surplus of £1,451,629: this is exceeded by the actual surplus reported in the telegram, viz., £2,044,000. For 1879-80 the return gives a budget estimate showing an expected deficit of £1,355,000: this is changed in the telegram to a surplus of £119,000. The opium revenue has done most to effect this change. In the Budget Estimate for 1879-80 opium brings in £6,500,000; an improvement upon this of £1,900,000 is reported. In regard to this, one would like to know how many chests of opium have been sold, and whether the increase is due to rise in price or increased demand in China. In either case the fact of the increase points to a diminution in the production of opium in China; and this leads us to believe that the Chinese Government has been partially successful in extirpating the poppy, or that the drought and famine in North China have produced the result.

But the most important inference from Sir John Strachey's successful finance is that the Indian finances are by no means in the desperate condition that was supposed. £1,250,000 can be saved in the army. The proposal to tax the official and professional classes, which has already been embodied in a Bill, though abandoned for the present, might be carried out, and would produce, say £300,000. The expenditure for Afghan war and war railways, which of course is extraordinary, is about £4,500,000 per annum for two years. Adding these items up, we have a total of over six millions, which in coming years of peace will be at the disposal of the Indian Finance minister. The average opium receipts during the past ten years have been under £6,500,000 *per annum*. If, therefore, this telegraphic summary of Sir John Strachey's statement can be relied upon, preparations for dealing with the opium revenue might safely be commenced forthwith.

Reuter's telegraphic summary of Lord Lytton's speech on finance, received March 2, corroborates the above view of the hopeful prospects of the Indian revenue. On this telegram the *Times* remarks: "If the average net income of the past two years be compared with that of 1868-70, it will appear that there has been, according to Lord Lytton, an increase of more than six millions and a half, resulting, as we are told, 'not from additional taxation, but from improved procedure, and the natural growth of revenue.'"

PUBLICATIONS OF THE ANGLO-ORIENTAL SOCIETY FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE OPIUM TRADE.

ENGLAND, CHINA, AND OPIUM. Three Essays reprinted from the *Contemporary Review*. By the Hon. SIR EDWARD FRY, one of the judges of the High Court of Justice.

"Sir Edward Fry's Essays are written in a sober and impartial spirit; and they are an excellent summary of the arguments on either side."—*The Examiner*.

EDWARD BUMPUS, 5 & 6, Holborn Bars.

(Price One Shilling.)

THE OPIUM QUESTION. A Review of the Opium Policy of Great Britain, and its results to India and China. By the Rev. ARTHUR E. MOULE, B.D., of the Church Missionary Society, Ningpo.

"A conspectus of the opium question which is alike excellent for the variety of its details, the clearness of its statements, and its fair and temperate manner."—*Christian Observer*.

SEELEY, JACKSON, & HALLIDAY, 54, Fleet Street.

(Price Sixpence.)

THE POPPY PLAGUE AND ENGLAND'S CRIME. By J. F. B. TINLING, B.A.

We can conceive nothing more calculated to influence public opinion than the wide distribution of such a work as this, with its careful sketches, its moderate yet stirring statements, and its true humanity."—*The Nonconformist*.

(Price Two Shillings.)

BRITISH OPIUM POLICY AND ITS RESULTS TO INDIA AND CHINA.

By F. S. TURNER, B.A.

"The essay before us bears marks of considerable industry, and is inspired by a sincere enthusiasm that it would be unjust not to respect."—*The Hour*.

London: SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, SEARLE, & RIVINGTON.

(Price Four Shillings.)

REPLY OF THE K'UEN KEË SHAY, the Canton Association for the Promotion of Abstinence from Opium, to the Address of the Anglo-Oriental Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade. Translated from the Chinese by the Rev. JOHN CHALMERS, M.A.

(Price One Penny, or Seven Shillings per hundred.)

THE FRIEND OF CHINA. Published Monthly, Price One Penny. Volumes I. and II., bound in cloth. Price One Shilling and Sixpence each. Vol. III., Half-a-crown.

SIR WILLIAM MUIR'S MINUTE and other Extracts from Papers published by the Calcutta Government. Price Twopence.

ANTI-OPIUM TRACTS.

No. I. The Opium Monopoly. Eight pages. One Halfpenny each, or Three Shillings and Sixpence per hundred.

No. II. The Opium Smoker. Eight Pages. One Halfpenny each, or Three Shillings and Sixpence per hundred.

No. III. The Opium Revenue of India. Eight pages. By R. N. Fowler, Esq., M.A., F.R.G.S. One Halfpenny each, or Three Shillings and Sixpence per hundred.

No. IV. Appeal to the Clergy. Eight pages. One Halfpenny each, or Three Shillings and Sixpence per hundred.

No. V. What the Chinese think about Opium. Twelve pages. One Halfpenny each, or Four Shillings per hundred.

No. VI. Our Opium Trade with China, and England's Injustice towards the Chinese. By W. E. Ormerod. One Penny each, or Seven Shillings per hundred.

No. VII. Alcohol and Opium. Four pages. Two Shillings per hundred.

No. VIII. Our National Opium Trade: its character and effects described by Extracts from Blue-books. Sixteen pages. One Penny each, or Seven Shillings per hundred.

No. IX. The Facts of the Opium Trade. Four pages. Two Shillings per hundred.

Any of the above will be forwarded, on application to the SECRETARY, from the Office of the Society, 8, Buckingham Street, Strand, W.C.

Anglo-Oriental Society

FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE OPIUM TRADE.

Vice-Presidents.

THE RIGHT REV. THE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM.
 THE RIGHT REV. THE LORD BISHOP OF RIPON.
 THE RIGHT REV. THE LORD BISHOP OF SALISBURY.
 MR. ALDERMAN W. MCARTHUR, M.P.
 JAMES RISDON BENNETT, Esq., M.D., LL.D., F.R.S.

General Council.

| | |
|--|---|
| STAFFORD ALLEN, Esq. WM. S. ALLEN, Esq., M.P. Rev. HENRY ALLON, D.D. Professor SHELDON AMOS, M.A. EDWARD BAINES, Esq. J. GURNEY BARCLAY, Esq. Rev. GORDON CALTHROP, M.A. C. CAMERON, Esq., M.D., LL.D., M.P. W. T. CHARLEY, Esq., D.C.L., M.P. Lord ALFRED CHURCHILL. J. J. COLMAN, Esq., M.P. Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. COTTON, K.C.S.I. JAMES COWAN, Esq., M.P. S. RATHBONE EDGE, Esq., M.P. Rev. C. C. FENN, M.A. Sir H. M. HAVELOCK, Bart., M.P. ALFRED HOWELL, Esq. THOMAS HUGHES, Esq., Q.C., F.S.A. Rev. SAMUEL HUMBE. WALTER H. JAMES, Esq., M.P. D. J. JENKINS, Esq., M.P. EDWARD JENKINS, Esq., M.P. Sir J. H. KENNAWAY, Bart., M.P. Professor LEONE LEVI, F.S.A., F.S.S. Rev. Canon LIDDON, D.D., D.C.L. | HUGH MASON, Esq. A. MCARTHUR, Esq., M.P. DAVID M'LAREN, Esq. Rev. ALEXANDER MACLAREN, B.A. CH. H. MELDON, Esq., Q.C., LL.D., M.P. Rev. Canon MILLER, D.D. Rev. H. C. MILWARD. Capt. the Hon. R. MORETON. ERNEST NOEL, Esq., M.P. J. W. PEASE, Esq., M.P. Rev. W. MORLEY PUNSHON, LL.D. HENRY RICHARD, Esq., M.P. B. W. RICHARDSON, Esq., M.D., F.R.S. HUDSON SCOTT, Esq. THOMSON SHARPE, Esq. Rev. C. H. SPURGEON. MARK J. STEWART, Esq., M.P. J. THOMSON, Esq., F.R.G.S. Rev. J. F. B. TYNLING, B.A. E. O. TERGELLES, Esq. Rev. H. W. TUCKER, M.A. E. B. UNDERHILL, Esq., LL.D. Very Rev. C. J. VAUGHAN, D.D. S. D. WADDY, Esq., Q.C., M.P. Rev. H. WRIGHT, M.A. |
|--|---|

&c., &c., &c.

Executive Committee.

| | |
|---|---|
| ARTHUR ALBRIGHT, Esq. ROBERT BAXTER, Esq. F. W. CHESSON, Esq. F. C. CLAYTON, Esq. Mr. Alderman FOWLER. Rev. J. P. GLEDSTONE. Rev. H. GRATTAN GUINNESS. SAMUEL GURNEY, Esq., F.R.G.S., F.L.S. THOMAS HANBURY, Esq. JOHN HILTON, Esq. HENRY HIPSLEY, Esq. EDW. HUTCHINSON, Esq. Rev. JAMES LEGGE, D.D., LL.D. | W. LOCKHART, Esq., F.R.C.S., F.R.G.S. Mr. Alderman W. MCARTHUR, M.P. DONALD MATHESON, Esq. W. MORGAN, Esq. J. C. PARRY, Esq. EDWARD PEASE, Esq. ROBERT SAWYER, Esq. T. B. SMITHIES, Esq. EDMUND STURGE, Esq. JOSEPH STURGE, Esq. Lieut.-Gen. C. W. TREMENHEERE. A. WYLIE, Esq. |
|---|---|

Treasurer—Mr. Alderman FOWLER. **Secretary**—Rev. F. STORRS TURNER, B.A.

Travelling Secretary—Rev. GOODEVE MABBS.

Bankers—Messrs. DIMSDALE, FOWLER, BARNARD, & DIMSDALE, 50, Cornhill.

Office—8, Buckingham Street, Strand, W.C.

Contributions in aid of the Society's operations will be thankfully received by the Treasurer, at Messrs. DIMSDALE, FOWLER, & Co.'s Bank, 50, Cornhill, by any member of the Executive Committee, or by the Secretary at the Office.

Post-Office Orders please make payable at Charing Cross, W.C.; Cross Cheques, DIMSDALE, FOWLER, & Co.



11/11/11

